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Abstract
Extending the literature on quality and trade and supported by the empirical ev-
idence obtained from China, this paper demonstrates that in a developing country, a
ﬁrm’s export to developed countries has a potential signaling eﬀect on domestic con-
sumers’ perception of its product quality. The model analyzes the signaling and imitat-
ing strategies of diﬀerent types of ﬁrms in their decisions to export, and characterizes
the conditions for the separating, pooling, and hybrid equilibria. Next, the analysis
shows that the strategic exporting of low-quality producers under informational asym-
metry can result in dumping. Moreover, the model shows that the implementation of
antidumping measures of foreign countries can lead to a Pareto improvement for the
ﬁrms and consumers of the home country under some circumstances.
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of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong. E-mail: huyf@hku.hk.“There is considerable evidence that quality variation is greater in underdeveloped than
developed areas. .... Any comparison of the heterogeneity of quality in the street market (in
India) and the canned qualities of the American supermarket suggests that quality variation
is a greater problem in the East than in the West.” Akerlof (1970, p.496)
1. Introduction
As illustrated in the above quotation, great variations in product quality are often widely
observed in developing countries.1 Motivated by this observation, the current paper provides
an analysis of quality and trade under asymmetric information. The purposes of this paper
are of two folds. First, by extending the original contributions of Bagwell and Staiger (1989),
Bagwell (1991), and Shy (2000), we show that exporting to developed countries can poten-
tially serve as a signaling mechanisms for high-quality producers in developing countries.
Second, we provide a new model of dumping from a perspective of signaling/imitating.
The model considers two types of ﬁrms (A and B) in a developing economy. Type A
ﬁrms produce high-quality goods, while Type B ﬁrms produce low-quality goods. Every
ﬁrm faces a home market and a potential foreign market. In the home market of the
developing country, a ﬁrm’s type and its product quality are the ﬁrm’s private information.
However, there is generally much less asymmetric information about the quality of goods
in the foreign market of developed countries, because of much better quality control, much
stricter government regulations on product quality and information disclosure, and a much
more developed legal system of consumer protection in developed countries.2 Thus, if ﬁrms
export, the quality of their products will to a large extent be revealed to foreign consumers.
Consequently, a Type A ﬁrm would obtain a higher proﬁt (or incur a smaller loss) than a
Type B ﬁrm in the foreign market.
In line with Linder (1961), a number of recent studies demonstrate that individuals’
1See, for example, Rashid (1988) and Suri (1988) for some case studies in some developing countries and
some countries in historical times.
2For example, in China, a developing country, food poison or even fake medicine that cause death or
serious injury are a major concern (e.g. “China deaths blamed on rat poison,” cnn.com, September 16,
2002; “Four killed after using spurious drug,” China Daily, May 16, 2006). In the USA, in contrast, many
pharmaceutical companies or even tobacco companies are sued and penalized for not providing enough
information to consumers.demand for quality increase with their incomes so that consumers’ preference for high-
quality goods is much stronger in developed countries than developing countries.3 This
literature implies that a ﬁrm’s proﬁto rl o s si nt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e ts i g n i ﬁcantly depends on
its type (because the demand for low-quality goods is very low in developed countries).
Then, the analysis shows that a ﬁrm’s act of exporting can potentially serve as a signal to
domestic consumers that it produces high-quality goods. For example, a Type A ﬁrm may
want to distinguish itself from Type B ﬁrms by exporting, which may result in a separating
equilibrium in which a ﬁrm exports if and only if it is of Type A. In such a case, a ﬁrm’s
type is revealed to domestic consumers, and consequently a Type A ﬁrm will obtain a higher
proﬁta n daT y p eBﬁrm will obtain a lower proﬁt in the domestic market. Also, a Type B
ﬁrm may try to hide its type by imitating Type A ﬁrms through exporting, provided that
its loss in the foreign market is small enough. If both types of ﬁrms export, then there
will be a pooling equilibrium. In this case, domestic consumers cannot discern ﬁrms’ types,
and consequently Type B ﬁrms beneﬁta tt h ee x p e n s eo fT y p eAﬁrms in the domestic
market. Further, the analysis reveals a hybrid equilibrium, in which Type A ﬁrms always
export, while Type B ﬁrms randomize their decision whether to export or not. Under such
a scenario, when Type B ﬁrms export, there will be a pooling equilibrium; when Type B
ﬁrms do not export, there will be a separating equilibrium.
Next, based on the framework presented in the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h i sp a p e r ,w ep r o v i d ean e w
model of dumping. Its basic argument is as follows. Because consumers’ preference for low-
quality goods is weaker when their incomes are higher, the price elasticity with respect to
product quality is much higher in developed countries than in developing countries. Thus, a
ﬁrm that produces low-quality goods (i.e. a Type B ﬁrm), if it exports, will likely charge a
price in the foreign market of the developed countries that is lower than its domestic price,
which implies that a ﬁrm may engage in “dumping” (by the deﬁnition normally used in the
existing literature). This can happen in a pooling equilibrium or a hybrid equilibrium of
the model.
3For example, see Flam and Helpman (1987), Copeland and Kotwal (1996), Murphy and Shleifer (1997),
Schott (2004), Fan (2005), Hummels and Klenow (2005), and Hallak (2006).
2M o r e o v e r ,s i n c et h er e v e n u e sf r o me x p o r t i n gl o w - q u a l i t yg o o d sa r el o w ,aT y p eBﬁrm is
likely to suﬀer a loss in the foreign market. Therefore, the model implies that informational
asymmetry between producers and consumers in a developing country is a possible source
of dumping. If there were no informational asymmetry, a Type B ﬁrm would not export
and hence “dumping” would not take place. However, when asymmetric information exists
between ﬁrms and domestic consumers, a Type B ﬁrm will choose to export if its increased
proﬁt in the domestic market (resulting from the counter-signaling eﬀe c to fe x p o r t i n g )i s
greater than the loss in the foreign market. Meanwhile, since low-quality products face a
low demand in the foreign market, a Type B ﬁrm likely charges a foreign price that is lower
that its domestic price, which results in “dumping”. Thus, this paper provides a new model
of dumping, which complements the existing literature. Moreover, we conduct an analy-
sis of trade policy. The model shows that if antidumping policies of foreign countries are
implemented in strict accordance with the deﬁnition of the WTO (as stated in economics
textbooks) rather than politically motivated and manipulated, then they may have both
positive and negative impacts on the welfare of the home country, depending on the para-
meter conﬁgurations of the model. In particular, it demonstrates that the implementation
of antidumping measures of foreign countries can lead to a Pareto improvement for the ﬁrms
and consumers of the home country under some circumstances.
In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 discusses the theoretical antecedents and
presents some empirical evidence that motivates this theoretical analysis. Section 3 sets
up the basic analytical framework. Section 4 investigates the signaling and imitating strate-
gies of diﬀerent types of ﬁrms and characterizes the conditions for the separating, pooling
and hybrid equilibria under asymmetric information. Section 5 presents a new model of
dumping and analyzes the new implications of antidumping policy. Section 6 summarizes
the paper. Most of the mathematical proofs are provided in the Appendix.
32. Theoretical Antecedents and Empirical Motivation
2.1. Theoretical Antecedents
This paper is based on the received literature on quality and trade under asymmetric infor-
mation. The pioneering studies of this literature are Bagwell and Staiger (1989) and Bagwell
(1991), who examine the cases wherein a ﬁrm’s product quality is imperfect information for
foreign consumers. More recently, Shy (2000), to whom our paper is particularly closely
related, extends Bagwell and Staiger (1989) and Bagwell (1991) from a one-country setting
to a two-country setting. Shy (2000) examines a model in which a ﬁrm operates for two
periods. In the ﬁrst period, its product quality to known to neither domestic nor foreign
consumers; in the second period, its product quality is revealed to all consumers. Also, Shy
(2000) assumes that if a ﬁrm exports, it incurs a ﬁxed cost of export and receives export
subsidies from the government. Moreover, Shy (2000) assumes that the amount of export
subsidies are proportional to a ﬁrm’s value of overseas sales, which implies that the export
subsidies that the ﬁrm receives increase with its product quality since a higher quality prod-
uct yields a higher value of overseas sales (in the second period). Then, Shy (2000) shows
that under some parameter conﬁgurations, a ﬁrm will produce high-quality goods if and
only if it exports, which implies that export serves as a signal of high quality products to
both domestic and foreign consumers. Shy (2000) also shows that the signaling eﬀect of
export does not exist if there is no export subsidy or if the export subsidy is determined by
the quantity (rather than the value) of overseas sales.
The current paper extends Shy (2000) mainly in the underlying reasons for why export
can serve as a signal of product quality. In Shy (2000), the underlying reason is that ﬁrms
receive export subsidy and the export subsidy increases with a ﬁrm’s export revenue. In
contrast, export subsidy plays no role in our model. Instead, in our paper, the underlying
reason for the signaling eﬀect of export is that richer countries have more demand for
high-quality products than poor countries and that a ﬁrm’s product quality is much better
revealed in developed countries than developing countries. In particular, the current paper is
in line with the insight of Linder (1961) and incorporates some unique features of developing
4countries, which have been abstracted from consideration in the received literature. As
illustrated by the evidence presented in the next subsection and the literature listed in
Footnote 3, the argument provided in the current paper has signiﬁcant empirical relevance.
Moreover, the new model of dumping provided in the second part of the paper, which
highlights the strategic exporting (and often dumping) behavior of low-quality producers,
further illustrates the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst part of the current paper and Shy (2000).
2.2. Empirical Motivation
This subsection provides empirical support for our proposition that in a developing country,
a ﬁrm’s decision to export to the developed countries has a signalling eﬀect on domestic
consumers’ perception of its products’ quality. The evidence is obtained by observing an
unusual characteristic of commercial advertising in China. Since the late 1980s, advertising
has been popular in China, and has become the major channel for Chinese ﬁrms to convey
valuable information, particularly about their product quality, to Chinese consumers.4 Com-
paring advertisements in China with those in western countries, we observe that Chinese
ﬁrms often, and unusually, stress that their products are exported to developed countries.
Some examples are given below.
(1) An air conditioner producer (Chuan Lan) claimed: “We proudly announce
that our air conditioners are exported to 22 countries in North America, Europe,
and East Asia!” (3/14/1994, Jin Ji Daily).
(2) A rubber tire manufacturer (Hua Xiang) stated that their tires had obtained
DOT standard certiﬁcate in the US and ECE standard certiﬁcate in Western
Europe, and that their products were exported to many advanced countries
(1/1/94, Jin Ji Daily).
(3) A leather company (Lu Yu) claimed: “Our company has established trading
4In fact, since there were few well recognized national brands in the central planned economy in pre-
reform China, Chinese ﬁrms might even have had more incentives than their western counterparts in utilizing
advertisements to promote their products.
5companies in Japan, the USA, France, Italy and Australia.” (10/6/97, Jin Ji
Daily)
(4) A cashmere sweater manufacturer (Er Duo Si) proudly declared: “Our
s w e a t e r sa r ew a r m i n gt h ew h o l ew o r l d !” (12/7/97, Jin Ji Daily).
We have systematically surveyed the daily advertisements in the three most widely circu-
lated national newspapers in China - People’s Daily, Jin Ji Daily and Wen Hui Morning Post
- between 1991 and 2000. We concentrated on the manufacturing industries, which were the
main sources of China’s exports. We divided the manufacturing industries into 18 sectors,
based on the 2 digit international standard industrial classiﬁcation (ISIC) code. We went
through the classiﬁed sections of the three newspapers (of everyday for those 10 years), and
recorded the total number of advertisements and the number of advertisements mentioning
the exports of products to advanced countries for each sector. Then, we summarized the
results to a monthly brief, yearly brief and ﬁnally to Table 1.
Table 1 is about here
As evidenced in Table 1, the proportion of the advertisements that refer to exporting to
rich countries is high. For example, in the People’s Daily, Jin Ji Daily and Wen Hui Morn-
ing Post, 32.0%, 28.5%, and 44.4% respectively of the advertisements for rubber products
claimed export to rich countries. The percentage of ﬁrms claiming exports to rich countries
varied across sectors, and might be proportional to the percentage of ﬁrms exporting in that
sector.5 In sum, the summary statistics support the view that it is a quite commonly used
strategy as well as a source of great pride for ﬁrms to provide information on their exports if
they have any.6 These ﬁndings provide clear empirical support for our argument that, in a
5For example, the sectors of textile, apparel, leather products, wood products, rubber products, plastic
products, fabricated metal products machinery and household electronic apparatus have high percentages of
advertisements claiming exports. This is consistent with our expectations since China has had comparative
advantage in world trade in these sectors.
6In fact, even when China was a planned economy before 1978, commodities labeled as “Chu Kou Zhuan
Nei Xiao”, meaning “originally exported products that are turned into domestic sales”, were regraded as
high-quality goods.
6developing country, a ﬁrm’s export to developed countries has a signaling eﬀect on domestic
consumers’ perception of its products’ quality.
3. The Basic Analytic Framework
We use the simplest model to highlight the essential idea of the paper. We consider a proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrm (monopoly) that faces a home market and a potential foreign market. The
ﬁrm always produces for the home market, but it may or may not sell its products in the
foreign market.
3.1. The Home Market
I nt h eh o m em a r k e t ,t h ed e m a n df u n c t i o nt h a tt h eﬁrm faces is
p =( 1+λx)z − aq (3.1)
where p and q are the price and the quantity demanded for its product in the home market,
respectively; z and a are positive coeﬃcients. The product can be of either low quality or
high quality. x is the domestic consumers’ perceived probability that the quality of the good
is of high quality, λ is a positive coeﬃcient. Clearly, the greater the probability that the
good is of high quality, the more consumers are willing to pay. This implies that “p”a n d
“x” are positively correlated.
The ﬁrm is one of two types: A and B. The ﬁrm produces high-quality goods if it is
of Type A; and low-quality goods if Type B. For simplicity, we assume that other charac-
teristics of the ﬁrm are the same regardless of its type. Speciﬁcally, we make the following
assumptions: (1) The unit cost of production is constant regardless of the type of the ﬁrm,
and is denoted by c.( 2 ) T h e ﬁrm’s type and its product quality are entirely the ﬁrm’s
private information in the home market.7 As will be clear, these assumptions guarantee
7If we instead assume that the unit cost is higher for producing high-quality goods and/or that consumers
may be able to obtain a prior belief about the product quality, then the optimal price that the ﬁrm charges
in the domestic market would depend on the ﬁrm’s type even in a pooling equilibrium. Consequently, similar
to the logic of Bagwell and Staiger (1989) and Bagwell (1991), in this case the signals that a ﬁrm may use
include not only exports but also the price charged in the domestic market, which drastically complicates
the algebra and the analysis. Thus, we focus only on the most essential signaling strategy, in order to make
the main point of the paper more clearly.
7that exporting is the only possible signal about product quality that the ﬁrm may provide
to its domestic consumers, which is the essence of this paper.8 Further, we assume that the
probability that the ﬁrm is of Type A is µ, and that the probability that the ﬁrm is of Type
Bi s1 − µ. In our model, except for the ﬁrm’s type and its product quality, all the other
parameters in the domestic and foreign markets are common knowledge.
Based on the above description, we can express the ﬁrm’s proﬁti nt h eh o m em a r k e ta s
follows:
[(1 + λx)z − aq]q − cq (3.2)
We assume that z>c , which implies that the optimal solution of q is interior. Then, from
the ﬁrst order condition, we get the optimal solution of q as
(1 + λx)z − c
2a
Consequently, the ﬁrm’s maximal proﬁt in the home market is




We will use ∗ to denote the variables and parameters associated with the foreign market.








where p∗ and q∗ are the price and the quantity demanded in the foreign market, respectively;
z∗ and a∗ are positive coeﬃcients. x∗ is the foreign consumers’ perceived probability that
t h ep r o d u c tq u a l i t yo ft h eﬁrm is of high quality, and λ
∗ is a positive coeﬃcient. We focus
8For example, suppose that we consider that the unit cost of high-quality goods is higher than that of
low-quality goods. In this case, the incentive for low-quality producers to signal their types to domestic
consumers continue to exist. Meanwhile, it is possible for them to signal through exporting as long as
two key assumptions of the paper hold that richer countries have more demand for high-quality products
than poor countries and that a ﬁrm’s product quality is much better revealed in developed countries than
developing countries.
8our analysis on the exports from the South to the North. Since the demand for low-quality
products in the foreign market of the North is low, λ
∗ c a nb em u c hl a r g e rt h a nλ.9
The empirical literature based on ﬁrm-level data has consistently demonstrated that
there exist ﬁxed costs for a ﬁrm to export.10 We denote the ﬁxed cost by M.11 Moreover,
we consider that there is generally much less asymmetric information about the quality of
goods in the foreign market of developed countries, because they have much better quality
control, much stricter government regulations on product quality and information disclosure,
and a much more developed legal system of consumer protection. To highlight this point,
we might as well assume that in the foreign market, if the ﬁrm sells low-quality goods, then
x∗ =0 ;i ft h eﬁrm sells high-quality goods, then x∗ =1 .













∗ − M (3.6)
We assume that z∗ >c , which implies that the optimal solution of q∗ is interior. Then, from
the ﬁrst order condition, we get the optimal solution of q∗ as
z∗ − c
2a∗
Hence, the ﬁrm’s maximal proﬁt in the foreign market will be
(z∗ − c)2
4a∗ − M (3.7)
9For example, Schott (2004, p.647) states: “The unit values of U.S. manufacturing imports vary widely
even within ﬁnely detailed product categories (depending on the levels of quality).... A c r o s sa l lU .S .m a n -
ufacturing imports, the mean high-to-low unit value ratio in 1994 was 24. These diﬀerences occur within a
single country; to put them in perspective, note that according to the Economist, the price of a Big Mac in
1999– across countries–varied by a factor of just 3.”
10For example, see Roberts and Tybout (1997), Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998), Bernard, Eaton,
Jensen, and Kortum (2003), and the survey by Tybout (2003). This literature explains that the ﬁxed
cost may arise because that a ﬁrm’s selling abroad entails investigating foreign demand and competition,
establishing marketing channels, and incurring other expenses.
11Note that the existence of the ﬁxed cost implies that it is innocuous to assume that the signaling eﬀect
of export is independent of the amount of exported products.















∗ − M (3.9)




Hence, the maximum proﬁti nt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e tw i l lb e
[(1 + λ
∗)z∗ − c]2
4a∗ − M (3.10)
To simplify our exposition, we make the following assumption throughout the paper:
(z∗ − c)2
4a∗ <M (3.11)
This assumption means that if the ﬁrm is of Type B, it will incur a loss in the foreign market
by exporting.
The current model is on ﬁrm behavior under asymmetric information. However, at the
outset of the analysis, it is useful to describe brieﬂy the case of symmetric information,
which means that both the ﬁrm and the domestic consumers know the type of the ﬁrm. In
the absence of asymmetric information, from Assumption (3.11), we know that the ﬁrm will













Clearly, the greater is λ
∗, the greater is ΓA − ΓB.
104. Quality and Export: A Signaling Perspective
4.1. Strategic Equilibria
This section analyzes ﬁrms’ strategic behavior under asymmetric information. Based on
Kreps and Wilson (1982), an equilibrium for this game is a collections of strategies and
beliefs that satisfy sequential rationality and the Bayes’ rule. In our model, the ﬁrm’s
type and its product quality are its private information in the home market. However, the
ﬁrm can try to signal or counter-signal its type to domestic consumers. The signal that
it can send to domestic consumers is whether to export or not. We assume that domestic
consumers can observe whether the ﬁrm exports or not. However, they can not observe the
price the ﬁrm sets or the quantity the ﬁrm sells in the foreign market.12
After observing the ﬁrm’s export status, domestic consumers infer the value of “x”
through the Bayes’ rule, which determines the demand function facing the ﬁrm in the
domestic market. Then, the ﬁrm chooses the optimal domestic price that maximizes its
proﬁt. In this model, we reﬁne the set of sequential equilibrium based on the “intuitive
criterion” of Cho and Kreps (1987). We therefore arrive at the following proposition, which
characterizes the separating and pooling equilibria of the strategic interaction between the
ﬁrm and domestic consumers.
Proposition 1: (1) Suppose that
λz[(2 + λ)z − 2c]
4a
+ ΓB <M<
λz[(2 + λ)z − 2c]
4a
+ ΓA (4.1)
Then, there is a unique separating equilibrium in which the ﬁrm will export if and only if it
is of Type A.
(2) Suppose that
M<
λµz[(2 + λµ)z − 2c]
4a
+ ΓB (4.2)
12Note that this assumption is only to save algebra. As will be intuitively straightforward, the results of
the model will materially hold if we instead assume that domestic consumers can only partially observe the
price the ﬁrm sets or the quantity the ﬁrm sells in the foreign market. Thus, we might as well choose the
simplest formulation, which signiﬁcantly saves the algebra.




λz[(2 + λ)z − 2c]
4a
+ ΓA (4.3)
Then, there is a unique pooling equilibrium in which the ﬁrm does not export regardless of
its type.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 formalizes the idea that in a developing country, a ﬁrm’s decision to
export to rich countries can serve as a signal to domestic consumers about the quality of
its products. Suppose that domestic consumers believe that the ﬁrm produces low-quality
goods if it does not export. Then, the equilibria exist (under this belief) if the outcome is
either that (i) the ﬁrm will export if and only if it is of Type A, or that (ii) the ﬁrm will
export regardless of its type. The ﬁrst case is a separating equilibrium, while the second
case is a pooling equilibrium.
In Proposition 1, a crucial parameter is the ﬁxed cost of export, M,w h o s er o l ei n
international trade has been much emphasized in the empirical literature (e.g. the literature
l i s t e di nF o o t n o t e9 ) .I fM is suﬃciently small such that (4.2) is satisﬁed, the ﬁrm will export
regardless of its type, which leads to a pooling equilibrium. (In this paper, we only use strict
inequality to describe the conditions (e.g. the above inequalities) to facilitate the discussions
and comparisons.) If M b e c o m e sl a r g e rs u c ht h a t( 4 . 1 )i ss a t i s ﬁed, the ﬁrm will export if
and only if it is of Type A, which results in a separating equilibrium. If M is too larger
such that (4.3) is satisﬁed, then the ﬁrm will not export, regardless of its type.
Further, noting that since µ<1,w eh a v e
λµz[(2 + λµ)z − 2c]
4a
<
λz[(2 + λ)z − 2c]
4a
Thus, when
λµz[(2 + λµ)z − 2c]
4a
+ ΓB <M<
λz[(2 + λ)z − 2c]
4a
+ ΓB
12then from the proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix, we know that in this case there will be
neither a separating nor a pooling equilibrium. If domestic consumers believe that there is
a separating equilibrium in which the ﬁrm will export if and only if it produces high-quality
goods, then x =1if the ﬁrm exports and x =0if it does not. In this case, the ﬁrm will
export even if it is of Type B, which contradicts the belief of a separating equilibrium. On
the other hand, if domestic consumers believe that there is a pooling equilibrium in which
the ﬁrm will export regardless of its type, then x = µ if the ﬁrm exports and x =0if it does
not. In this case, the ﬁr mw i l ln o te x p o r ti fi ti so fT y p eB ,w h i c hc o n t r a d i c t st h eb e l i e f
of a pooling equilibrium. Therefore, the ﬁrm will adopt hybrid strategies, which leads to a
hybrid equilibrium.
Based on the above reasoning, we have the following result.
Proposition 2: Suppose that
λµz[(2 + λµ)z − 2c]
4a
+ ΓB <M<
λz[(2 + λ)z − 2c]
4a
+ ΓB (4.4)
Then there is a hybrid equilibrium in which (1) if the ﬁrm is of Type A, it will export; (2)
if the ﬁrm is of Type B, it will export with a certain probability, π∗ (0 <π ∗ < 1),a n dw i l l
not export with a certain probability, 1 − π∗.
Proof. See Appendix.
With probability, π∗,t h eﬁrm will export if it is of Type B. (From the proof in the
appendix, we can see that π∗ maximizes the ﬁrm’s proﬁti fi ti so fT y p eBi ns t r a t e g i c
equilibrium.) Thus, if domestic consumers observe that the ﬁrm exports, they will infer
that the probability that the products are of high quality is
µ
µ +( 1− µ)π∗ (4.5)
Clearly, this probability decreases with π∗. With probability, 1−π∗,t h eﬁrm will not export
if it is of Type B. In this case, domestic consumers will be able to infer accurately the ﬁrm’s
type if they observe that the ﬁrm does not export.
134.2. Losses and Gains in Strategic Equilibria
Section 4 studies a ﬁrm’s strategic behaviors in a signaling and imitating game. Based on
the results in the last section, we now analyze under what conditions, a ﬁrm will incur a
loss in the foreign market. First, from Proposition 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1: (1) Suppose that the following condition is satisﬁed
M<min{ΓA,
λµz[(2 + λµ)z − 2c]
4a
+ ΓB} (4.6)
Then the ﬁrm will incur a loss in the foreign market if and only if it is of Type B.
(2) Suppose that the following condition is satisﬁed
ΓA <M<
λµz[(2 + λµ)z − 2c]
4a
+ ΓB (4.7)
Then the ﬁrm will incur a loss in the foreign market regardless of its type.
(3) Suppose that the following condition is satisﬁed
max{
λz[(2 + λ)z − 2c]
4a
+ ΓB,ΓA} <M<
λz[(2 + λ)z − 2c]
4a
+ ΓA (4.8)
Then the ﬁrm will incur a loss in the foreign market if and only if it is of Type A.
Proof. See Appendix.
In relation to Corollary 1, several comments are in order. First, when Condition (4.6) is
satisﬁed, we know from Proposition 1 that there exists a pooling equilibrium in which the
ﬁrm exports regardless of its type. In this case, the ﬁr m( T y p eB )w i l lc h o o s et oe x p o r te v e n
though it will incur a pure loss in the foreign market. However, by imitating the action of
export, the ﬁrm (Type B) can hide its type from domestic consumers, which will increase
its proﬁt in the domestic market by the amount of
λµz[(2 + λµ)z − 2c]
4a
In this case, the “bad-type” ﬁrm imitates the behavior of the “good-type” ﬁrm.
14Second, when Condition (4.1) is satisﬁed, there exists a separating equilibrium in which
the ﬁrm exports if and only if it is of Type A. In this case, the ﬁr m( T y p eA )w i l lc h o o s e
to export even when
M>ΓA
that is, the ﬁrm (Type A) will incur a pure loss in the foreign market. (Note that Condition
(4.8) is the combination between Conditions (4.1) and M>ΓA.) However, by exporting,
the ﬁrm can signal to domestic consumers that its products are of high quality, which will
increase its proﬁts in the domestic market by the amount of
λz[(2 + λ)z − 2c]
4a
In this case, the “good-type” ﬁrm chooses to distinguish itself from the “bad type” even
though it loses money in the foreign market.
Third, when Condition (4.2) is satisﬁed, there exists a pooling equilibrium in which
the ﬁrm exports regardless of its type. In this pooling equilibrium, if ΓA <M , then the
ﬁr mw i l li n c u rap u r el o s si nt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e te v e ni fi ti so fT y p eA .T h u s ,c l e a r l y ,t h e
ﬁrm would be better oﬀ by not exporting if domestic consumers do not have the belief
that it produces low-quality goods if it does not export. In other words, when both (4.2)
and ΓA <Mare satisﬁed, which yields Condition (4.7), the pooling equilibrium is Pareto
ineﬃcient. Furthermore, from the proofs of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 in the Appendix,
we can see that this possible equilibrium cannot be eliminated by the “intuitive criterion”
of Cho and Kreps (1987). Thus, in this case the ﬁrm’s strategy of signaling and imitating
in the domestic market leads to an outcome that is ineﬃcient for domestic ﬁrms.
Next, from Proposition 2, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2: (1) Suppose that the following condition is satisﬁed
λµz[(2 + λµ)z − 2c]
4a
+ ΓB <M<min{ΓA,
λz[(2 + λ)z − 2c]
4a
+ ΓB} (4.9)
15Then the ﬁr mw i l ln o ti n c u ral o s si nt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e ti fi ti so fT y p eA ,w h i l et h eﬁrm
will incur a loss in the foreign market with a certain probability, π∗,i fi ti so fT y p eB .
(2) Suppose that the following condition is satisﬁed
max{
λµz[(2 + λµ)z − 2c]
4a
+ ΓB,ΓA} <M<
λz[(2 + λ)z − 2c]
4a
+ ΓB (4.10)
Then the ﬁrm will always incur a loss in the foreign market if it is of Type A, while the ﬁrm
will incur a loss in the foreign market with a certain probability, π∗, if it is of Type B.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuitions of this corollary is similar to Corollary 1’s.
4.3. A Simple Welfare Assessment
For simplicity, this paper does not specify a social welfare function explicitly, and hence it
does not attempt to conduct a comprehensive and rigorous welfare analysis. Instead, in this
section we simply discuss the intuitions of the welfare implications of the model.
From the previous analysis, we can see that if there is a separating equilibrium or a
hybrid equilibrium, the quality of a product will be at least partially revealed to domestic
consumers. In this case, clearly, domestic consumers will experience an increase in welfare.
Also, if
ΓA >M
then a Type A ﬁrm enjoys a positive proﬁti nt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e t . T h u s ,i nt h i sc a s e ,t h e
signaling eﬀect of exporting to the developed countries results in an increase in welfare for
both domestic consumers and high-quality producers. Moreover, the recent literature of
industrial organization (e.g. Ohkawa et al., 2005) shows that in an imperfectly competitive
environment, the market selection may result in not only the wrong number of ﬁrms but also
the wrong type of ﬁrms that survive, which decreases social eﬃciency and social welfare.
This paper shows that exporting to the foreign market of developed countries can help the
16domestic market select the more eﬃcient ﬁrms (i.e. high-quality producers) in developing
countries.
In relation to Akerlof’s (1970) observation that quality uncertainty is much greater in
developing than developed countries, this paper demonstrates that ﬁrms in developing coun-
tries can utilize the transparency of quality in developed countries to signal their product
qualities to domestic consumers, which reduces the informational asymmetry about prod-
uct quality between producers and consumers in the developing countries. Therefore, the
current paper suggests that for developing countries, international trade not only can bring
them the familiar beneﬁts (for producers) of enhanced production eﬃciency from global spe-
cialization and international technological spillovers, but also may reduce the informational
asymmetry about product quality for consumers and hence increase their welfare.
However, we also note that under some other circumstances, the strategic interactions
will result in a pooling equilibrium, in which domestic consumers do not obtain any in-
formation from observing ﬁrms’ export behaviors. Meanwhile, from the perspective of the
whole economy, its ﬁrm’s expected net proﬁti nt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e ti s
µ(ΓA − M)+( 1− µ)(ΓB − M)
= µΓA +( 1− µ)ΓB − M (4.11)
Thus, this expected net proﬁti nt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e tw i l lb ep o s i t i v ei fa n do n l yi fµ and
ΓA are suﬃciently large. In particular, if ΓA <M , this expected proﬁtw i l lb en e g a t i v e .
In such a case, ﬁrms’ strategic actions of exporting to the foreign market will lead to an
unambiguous decrease in social welfare of the home country.
5. A New Model of Dumping
The last half century has witnessed continuous and signiﬁcant reductions in tariﬀsa n dq u o -
tas under the discipline of GATT/WTO.13 But against this trend, antidumping measures
13For example, Bagwell and Staiger (2002, p.3) summarize: “(T)hrough the eight rounds of GATT nego-
tiations, the average ad valorem tariﬀ on industrial goods has fallen from over 40% to below 4%. Over this
period, GATT/WTO membership has also grown in number from 23 to now over 140 countries.”
17have proliferated, and have become the most eﬀective tool of import restrictions. However,
as highlighted by some leading textbooks of international trade,14 several important ques-
tions as for the phenomenon of dumping have not been fully addressed. For example, are
there any underlying reasons that a ﬁrm may usually charge a lower price in the foreign
market than in the domestic market? Are ﬁrms from developing countries more likely to
engage in dumping than ﬁrms from developed countries? Is it possible that antidumping
measures can lead to an improvement in production eﬃciency and welfare for both home
and foreign countries? This section attempts to provide a new model of dumping, which
intends to complement the existing literature to yield new answers to these questions.
5.1. Dumping
Following most of the existing literature (e.g. Brander and Krugman, 1983; Markusen et
al, 1995; Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003), we deﬁne dumping as follows.15
Deﬁnition 1: A ﬁrm engages in dumping if and only if it charges a lower price in the
f o r e i g nm a r k e tt h a ni nt h eh o m em a r k e t .
Let pi and p∗
i denote the prices that a ﬁrm of Type i (i = A or B) charges in the home
market and the foreign market, respectively. Then, according to Deﬁnition 1, a ﬁrm dumps
in the foreign market if and only if
p
∗
i <p i (i = A or B)
I nt h ef o l l o w i n g ,w ea n a l y z eh o wt h eﬁrm’s incentives to signal or imitate in the home market
can result in its dumping behaviors in the foreign market that are consistent with the above
deﬁnition. As in the existing literature (e.g. Brander and Krugman, 1983), to highlight our
main points, in this subsection we consider the case in which there is no possibility that
the foreign government imposes antidumping duties so that a ﬁrm’s pricing decision is not
14For example, see Markusen et al. (1995) and Krugman and Obstfeld (2003).
15This deﬁnition is used by the WTO. For example, in the website of wto.org, it states: “If a company
exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges on its own home market, it is said to
be “dumping” the product.”
18aﬀected by this possibility. Then, after we present the new model of dumping, in the next
subsection we will discuss the implications of antidumping policies.






























Then, from Proposition 1, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: (1) Suppose that (4.1) is satisﬁed such that the ﬁrm will export if and only if






(2) Suppose that (4.2) is satisﬁed such that the ﬁrm will export regardless of its type. Then,






(ii) if the ﬁrm is of Type B, it will dump in the foreign market if and only if
z
∗ < (1 + λµ)z (5.5)
Proof. See Appendix.
It should be noted that the condition for that a Type A ﬁrm engages in dumping in
a separating equilibrium is diﬀerent from that in a pooling equilibrium. It is because in a
separating equilibrium, a Type A ﬁrm sets a domestic price at the (rational) expectation
that domestic consumers know its type; in a pooling equilibrium, a Type A ﬁrm sets a
domestic price at the expectation that domestic consumers do not know its type. In others
19w o r d s ,t h ed o m e s t i cp r i c et h a taT y p eAﬁrm sets in a separating equilibrium is diﬀerent
from that in a pooling equilibrium. Also, as shown in (5.2), the foreign price that a Type A
ﬁrm sets in a separating equilibrium is the same as that in a pooling equilibrium. Therefore,
the condition for a Type A ﬁrm engaging in dumping in a separating equilibrium is diﬀerent
from that in a pooling equilibrium.
Similar to Lemma 1 and the above reasoning, we now discuss the case in a hybrid
equilibrium. First, we deﬁne
ρ ≡
µ
µ +( 1− µ)π∗ (5.6)
Then, from Proposition 2, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Suppose that (4.4) is satisﬁed such that there is a hybrid equilibrium in which
if the ﬁrm is of Type A, it will export; if the ﬁrm is of Type B, it will export with a certain
probability. Then, we have the following results:
(i) When the ﬁr md o e sn o te x p o r ti fi ti so fT y p eB ,aT y p eAﬁrm will dump in the
foreign market if and only if (5.3) is satisﬁed.
(ii) When the ﬁr me x p o r t si fi ti so fT y p eB ,aT y p eAﬁrm will dump in the foreign






and a Type B ﬁrm will dump in the foreign market if and only if
z
∗ < (1 + λρ)z (5.8)
Proof. See Appendix.
From Lemmas 1 and 2, obviously, we have the following proposition.




∗ < (1 + λµ)z (5.9)
20then the ﬁrm will dump in the foreign market if and only if it is of Type B.




∗ < (1 + λρ)z (5.10)
are satisﬁed, then the ﬁrm will dump in the foreign market with a certain probability, π∗,i f
and only if it is of Type B.
Proposition 3 emphasizes that the producers of low-quality goods are likely to engage
in dumping if they choose to export. Since foreign consumers’ willingness to pay increases
substantially with an increase in product quality, from (3.4) it implies that the value of λ
∗ is
large; since foreign consumers’ willingness to pay is small for low quality goods (even when
x∗ is small), from (3.4) we know that the value of z∗ is small.16 Note that (5.9) and (5.10)
a r el i k e l yt ob es a t i s ﬁed if λ
∗ is suﬃciently large and z∗ is suﬃciently small. Therefore,
because consumers’ preference for low-quality goods is much weaker in developed countries
than developing countries, a ﬁrm that produces low-quality goods (i.e. a Type B ﬁrm)
is likely to charge a price in the foreign market of the developed countries lower than its
domestic price, which means that the ﬁrm (Type B) may engage in “dumping”.17
Moreover, recall that since there is a ﬁxed cost of export and the revenues from exporting
low-quality goods are low, a Type B ﬁrm suﬀers a loss in the foreign market. Therefore,
Proposition 3 implies that informational asymmetry between producers and consumers in a
developing country is a possible source of dumping. If there is no informational asymmetry,
aT y p eBﬁrm would not export and “dumping” would not take place. However, when
asymmetric information exists between ﬁrms and domestic consumers, a Type B ﬁrm will
choose to export (and consequently engage in “dumping”) if its increased proﬁti nt h e
domestic market (resulting from the counter-signaling eﬀect of exporting) is greater than
16For example, Schott (2004, p.647) states: “The unit values of U.S. manufacturing imports vary widely
even within ﬁnely detailed product categories (depending on the levels of quality).... A c r o s sa l lU .S .m a n -
ufacturing imports, the mean high-to-low unit value ratio in 1994 was 24. These diﬀerences occur within a
single country; to put them in perspective, note that according to the Economist, the price of a Big Mac in
1999– across countries–varied by a factor of just 3.”
17Also, note that a Type B ﬁrm’s act of export increases the domestic demand for its products and hence
increases its domestic price, which further increases its likelihood of dumping.
21the loss in the foreign market. Thus, this paper formalizes a new model of dumping, which
complements the existing literature.
In addition, a few comments are in order as for Proposition 3. First, Part (1) of this
proposition describes the case of continuous dumping, Part (2) presents a case of “sporadic”
dumping.18 Second, this proposition suggests that ﬁrms from developing countries have a
further incentive to dump in foreign markets than ﬁrms from developed countries.19 Third,
it implies that if a ﬁrm from a developing country engages in “dumping” in a developed
country, it may also truly suﬀer a loss in the foreign market. Finally, if anti-dumping policy
is implemented strictly according to Deﬁnition 1 (rather than mainly politically motivated),
then we would observe that higher-quality producers from developing countries are less likely
to engage in “dumping”.
5.2. Antidumping
In this subsection, based on the new model of dumping presented in Subsection 5.1, we
examine the implications of antidumping policies. For simplicity, we now make the following
assumptions: (1) antidumping policies are implemented strictly according to Deﬁnition 1;
(2) if antidumping duty is imposed, then the antidumping duty is suﬃciently high such
that the ﬁrm will stop exporting. Then, from Proposition 3 and Corollary 1, we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 3: (1) Suppose that (4.2) and (5.9) are satisﬁed, then the implementation of
18A number of important studies have analyzed theory of cyclical (or sporadic) dumping. For example,
Ethier (1982), Das (1992), and Staiger and Wolak (1992) show that cyclical dumping arises due to ﬂuctu-
ations in demand in home and foreign markets and the ﬁrm’s inability to fully adjust its output to these
ﬂuctuations. Proposition 3 provides an alternative explanation by suggesting that sporadic dumping can
be a feature of a hybrid equilibrium. Thus, this result complements the existing literature.
19In fact, this result provides an explanation for why dumping from foreign ﬁrms was more of a concern in
developed countries than in developing countries. Indeed, the use of antidumping measures was conﬁned to
a few most developed countries until the 1980s (e.g. Niels and ten Kate, 2004). More recently, antidumping
measures have also been widely used by developing countries. However, this is probably because developing
countries are increasingly aware that using antidumping policies is the most eﬀective or even the only way to
defend themselves against antidumping measures against them by developed countries (e.g. Prusa (2001),
Aggarwal (2004)).
22antidumping policy by the foreign country will reveal the type of the ﬁrm’s product quality
to the consumers of the home country.
(2) Suppose that (4.7) and (5.4) are satisﬁed, then the implementation of antidumping
policy by the foreign country will result in a Pareto improvement for the home country.
(3) Suppose that (5.3) is satisﬁed and
λz[(2 + λ)z − 2c]
4a
+ ΓB <M<ΓA (5.11)
then the implementation of antidumping policy by the foreign country will result in an
unambiguous decrease in the welfare for the home country.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 3 illustrates that antidumping measures imposed by foreign countries can have
both positive and negative impacts on the welfare of the home country, depending on the
parameter conﬁgurations of the model. (However, it should be emphasized that we assume
that antidumping policies of foreign countries are implemented in strict accordance with the
deﬁnition of the WTO (as stated in economics textbooks) rather than politically motivated
and manipulated.) Parts (1) and (2) of this corollary analyze some positive impacts, while
P a r t( 3 )e x a m i n e ss o m en e g a t i v ei m p a c t s .
Part (1) of this corollary suggests that in the case of a pooling equilibrium in which
domestic consumers cannot distinguish a ﬁrm’s type, the implementation of antidumping
policy by the foreign country will deter a Type B ﬁrm from exporting under some cir-
cumstances, which will eﬀectively turn a pooling equilibrium into a separating equilibrium.
Consequently, domestic consumers will be able to correctly infer the quality of a product
they purchase.
Part (2) of Corollary 3 yields a somewhat surprising result about the consequences of
implementing antidumping policies. This result is related to the last part of Subsection 4.3,
and its logic is as follows. When (4.7) is satisﬁed, the ﬁrm will export and incur a loss in
23the foreign market regardless of its type if there is no antidumping measure. Also, if (5.4)
is satisﬁed, an antidumping policy will apply to the ﬁrm regardless of its type,20 which will
result in that the ﬁrm stops exporting regardless of its type after the implementation of
anti-dumping policy. Consequently, the ﬁrm faces the same domestic demand but does not
have to incur the pure loss from engaging in strategic export, which implies that the ﬁrm will
experience an increase in net proﬁt regardless of its type. Moreover, domestic consumers
are not aﬀected by the ﬁrm’s choice of not exporting in this case, because otherwise the
ﬁrm would export regardless of its type, so that domestic consumers would also not be
able to distinguish the ﬁrm’s type and discern its product quality. Thus, in this case
the ﬁrm’s strategy of signaling and imitating in the domestic market through the act of
exporting results in pure wastes. Therefore, the implementation of antidumping measures
by the foreign government can eliminate the equilibrium in which the ﬁrm is caught in
the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” of strategic exporting. Consequently, it can lead to a Pareto
improvement for the home country.
However, under some other parameter conﬁgurations, anti-dumping measures can reduce
the welfare of the home country. For example, if the conditions in Part (3) of Corollary 3 are
satisﬁed, without anti-dumping policy there is a separating equilibrium in which only the
ﬁrms that produce high-quality goods export and make positive proﬁts in the foreign market.
However, the implementation of anti-dumping policy will turn the separating equilibrium
into a pooling equilibrium, which reduces not only Type A ﬁrms’ proﬁts from export but
also eliminates consumers’ information about product quality in the domestic market. In
this case, the home country will likely experience a signiﬁcant decrease in social welfare.
6. Summary
Quality is a core issue in the study of international trade. In particular, as highlighted
by Akerlof (1970), asymmetric information in the quality of goods between producers and
consumers is widely observed in developing countries. The purposes of this paper are of
20Note that if (5.4) is satisﬁed, then clearly (5.5) will also be satisﬁed.
24two folds. First, by extending the received literature, we show that exporting to developed
countries can potentially serve as a signaling mechanisms for high-quality producers in
developing countries. Second, we provide a new model of dumping based on the signaling
model presented in this paper.
Drawing from the literature on quality and trade and supported by the empirical evidence
obtained from China, we demonstrate that in a developing country, a ﬁrm’s export to
developed countries has a potential signaling eﬀect on domestic consumers’ perception of its
product quality. This happens because the goods exported to rich countries are generally
of high quality by poor country standards. The model considers two types of ﬁrms (A and
B) in a developing economy. Type A ﬁrms produce high-quality goods, while Type B ﬁrms
produce low-quality goods. In the home market of the developing country, a ﬁrm’s type
and its product quality are the ﬁrm’s private information. However, there is generally much
less asymmetric information about the quality of goods in the foreign market of developed
countries. Thus, if ﬁrms export, the quality of their products will be largely revealed to
foreign consumers. As a ﬁrm’s proﬁt or loss in the foreign market may signiﬁcantly depend
on its type, the analysis shows that a ﬁrm’s act of exporting can potentially serve as a signal
to domestic consumers that it produces high-quality goods. For example, even if a Type
A ﬁrm incurs a loss in the foreign market, it may want to distinguish itself from Type B
ﬁrms by exporting. Consequently, it would obtain a higher proﬁt in the domestic market,
which would outweigh its loss in the foreign market. Also, a Type B ﬁrm may try to hide its
type by imitating Type A ﬁrms by exporting, provided that its loss in the foreign market is
small enough. The model analyzes the signaling and imitating strategies of diﬀerent types
of ﬁrms, and yields three possible equilibria: a separating equilibrium, a pooling equilibrium
and a hybrid equilibrium.
The second part of this paper derives a new model of dumping. Because consumers’
preference for low-quality goods is much weaker in developed countries than developing
countries, a ﬁrm that produces low-quality goods (i.e. a Type B ﬁrm) is likely to charge
a price in the foreign market of the developed countries lower than its domestic price.
25Moreover, since there is a ﬁxed cost of export and the revenues from exporting low-quality
goods are low, a Type B ﬁrm is likely to suﬀer a loss in the foreign market. Therefore, it
implies that informational asymmetry between producers and consumers in a developing
country is a possible source of dumping. If there is no informational asymmetry, a Type B
ﬁrm would not export and “dumping” would not take place. However, when asymmetric
information exists between ﬁrms and domestic consumers, a Type B ﬁrm will choose to
export (and consequently engage in “dumping”) if its increased proﬁt in the domestic market
(resulting from the counter-signaling eﬀect of exporting) is greater than the loss in the foreign
market. Thus, this paper presents a new model of dumping, which complements the existing
literature.
Further, the analysis implies that if antidumping policies of foreign countries are imple-
mented in strict accordance with the deﬁnition of the WTO rather than politically moti-
vated, then they may have both positive and negative impacts on the welfare of the home
country. For example, under some parameter conﬁgurations, a ﬁrm incurs a loss in the
foreign market in the pooling equilibrium regardless of its type. In this case, ﬁrms’ strategy
of signaling and imitating results in pure waste for the home country. Thus, the implemen-
tation of antidumping measures by the foreign country may eliminate this equilibrium in
which the ﬁrms of the home country are caught in the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” of strategic
exporting. Consequently, it can lead to a Pareto improvement for the ﬁrms and consumers
of the home country. However, under some other parameter conﬁgurations, anti-dumping
measures can reduce the welfare of the home country. For example, suppose that without
anti-dumping policy there is a separating equilibrium in which only the ﬁrms that produce
high-quality goods export and make positive proﬁts in the foreign market. In this case, the
implementation of anti-dumping policy will turn the separating equilibrium into a pooling
equilibrium, which reduces not only high-quality producers’ proﬁts but also eliminates con-
sumers’ information about product quality in the domestic market. Consequently, the home
country will likely experience a signiﬁcant decrease in social welfare.
267. Appendix: Proofs




4a∗ , ΓB ≡
(z∗ − c)2
4a∗
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
Suppose that domestic consumers believe that the ﬁrm produces low-quality goods if
it does not export. Then, the equilibria exist (under this belief) if the outcome is either
that (i) the ﬁrm will export if and only if it is of Type A, or that (ii) the ﬁrm will export
regardless of its type.
(i) Suppose that it is an equilibrium that the ﬁr mw i l le x p o r ti fa n do n l yi fi ti so fT y p e
A. Then, if the ﬁrm is of Type A, under such a belief, its total proﬁt by engaging in export
must be greater than that by not engaging in export; if the ﬁrm is of Type B, under such a
belief, its total proﬁt by engaging in export must be smaller than that by not engaging in
export.
Under such a belief and in equilibrium, if the ﬁrm is of Type A, its proﬁti s





4a∗ − M (7.1)




If the ﬁrm chooses to deviate from the equilibrium when it is of Type A, we must have
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If the ﬁrm chooses to deviate from the equilibrium when it is of Type B, we must have
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the ﬁrm will not deviate from the equilibrium regardless of its type. In this case, there
exists a separating equilibrium in which the ﬁrm exports if and only if it is of Type A.
27(ii) Suppose that it is an equilibrium that the ﬁrm will export regardless of its type.
In this case, domestic consumers do not have complete information of the ﬁrm’ product
quality. Recall that it is common knowledge that the probability that the ﬁrm is of Type A
is µ. Then, domestic consumers’ belief (via Bayes’ rule) that the ﬁrm’s product quality is
of high quality will be x = µ. In this case, if the ﬁrm is of Type A and it is in equilibrium,
its total proﬁt will be





4a∗ − M (7.8)
Similarly, if the ﬁrm is of Type B and it is in equilibrium, its total proﬁt will be




4a∗ − M (7.9)
If the ﬁrm chooses to deviate from the equilibrium when it is of Type A, we must have

















If the ﬁrm chooses to deviate from the equilibrium when it is of Type B, we must have






















the ﬁrm will not deviate from the equilibrium regardless of its type. In this case, there is a
pooling equilibrium in which the ﬁrm export regardless of its type.
Moreover, from the above proof, it is easy to see that if
M>






then the ﬁrm will not export regardless of its type. Namely, in this case, there will be a
pooling equilibrium in which the ﬁrm does not export regardless of its type and domestic
consumers believe that x = µ.
Finally, we try to prove that those equilibria are unique (under the mutually exclusive
technique conditions). The equilibrium in Part (3) of the proposition is obviously unique.
To prove the uniqueness of the equilibria in Parts (1) and (2) of the proposition, we only
need to prove the equilibria resulting from the belief that domestic consumers believe that
28the ﬁrm produces low-quality goods if it exports can be eliminated by utilizing the “intuitive
criterion” of Cho and Kreps (1987) when
M<






The belief that domestic consumers believe that the ﬁrm produces low-quality goods if it
exports can also results in a Nash equilibrium in which the ﬁrm does not export regardless
of its type. Under this belief and if it is in equilibrium, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt (regardless of its
type) will be
[(1 + µλ)z − c]2
4a
(7.17)
Clearly, the ﬁrm will not deviate from the equilibrium if it is of Type B. If it is of Type A






4a∗ − M (7.18)












µλz[(2 + µλ)z − 2c]
4a
(7.20)
In other words, even if the ﬁrm can make a positive proﬁt in the foreign market (i.e.
M<ΓA), it can still be a Nash equilibrium that the ﬁrm does not export regardless of
its type. However, this equilibrium cannot satisfy the “intuitive criterion” of Cho and
Kreps (1987). This is because if the ﬁrm is of Type B, it will be worse oﬀ by deviating
from the equilibrium under any circumstance. However, if it is of Type A, it may have an
incentive to deviate. Thus, if domestic consumers observe that the ﬁrm deviates from the
equilibrium by exporting, they can infer that the ﬁrm must be of Type A. In other words,
this equilibrium cannot survive the “intuitive criterion” of Cho and Kreps (1987), and hence
can be eliminated.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
In a hybrid equilibrium, the ﬁrm randomizes its decision whether to export or not if it
is of Type B. We denote the probability that the ﬁrm (Type B) will export by π. Then,
with probability, 1 − π, it will not export if it is of Type B. In this case, it is a separating




With probability, π, it will export if it is of Type B. In this case, it is a pooling equi-
librium, in which the domestic consumers will infer that the probability that the ﬁrm is of
Type A is
µ
µ +( 1− µ)π

















4a∗ − M} (7.23)
The optimal choice of π is determined by maximizing (7.23) subject to the constraint π ∈
[0,1]. Since (7.23) is a continuous function of π,a n d[0,1] is a compact set, the optimal
solution of π, which we denote by π∗, must exist. Further, π∗ can be obtained by solving

















[µ +( 1− µ)π]2}
=0
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 .
(1) When (4.2) is satisﬁed, the ﬁrm will export regardless of its type. Recall that
Assumption (3.11) implies that if the ﬁrm is of Type B, its exporting will result in a pure
loss. Meanwhile, if ΓA >M,t h e nt h eﬁrm will make a positive proﬁti nt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e t
if it is of Type A. The combination between (4.2) and ΓA >Myields (4.6).
(2) When (4.2) is satisﬁed, the ﬁrm will export regardless of its type. Then, the ﬁrm
will incur a loss in the foreign market if it is of Type B. Meanwhile, (4.1) indicates that if
the ﬁrm is of Type A, it will also incur a pure loss in the foreign market if ΓA <M .T h e
combination between (4.2) and ΓA <Myields (4.7).
(3) When (4.1) is satisﬁed, the ﬁrm will export if and only if it is of Type A. Mean-
while, (4.1) indicates that the ﬁrm (Type A) incurs a pure loss in the foreign market. The
combination between (4.1) and ΓA <Myields (4.8).
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y2 .
(1) When (4.4) is satisﬁed, there will be a hybrid equilibrium in which the ﬁrm will incur
al o s si nt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e tw i t hac e r t a i np r o b a b i l i t y ,π∗,i fi ti so fT y p eB .M e a n w h i l e ,
if ΓA >M , then the ﬁrm will make a proﬁti nt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e ti fi ti so fT y p eA .T h e
combination between (4.4) and ΓA >Myields (4.9).
(2) ΓA <Mindicates that the ﬁrm (Type A) incurs a pure loss in the foreign market.
Meanwhile, the ﬁrm will suﬀer a loss in the foreign market with a certain probability, π∗,i f
it is of Type B. The combination between (4.4) and ΓA <Myields (4.10).
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . (1) Suppose that (4.1) is satisﬁed such that the ﬁrm will export
if and only if it is of Type A. In this case, the ﬁrm’s type is revealed to domestic consumers
and hence it charges the following price in the domestic market
(1 + λ)z + c
2










∗ < (1 + λ)z
that is, Inequality (5.3) is satisﬁed.
(2) Suppose that (4.2) is satisﬁed such that the ﬁrm will export if and only if regardless
of its type. In this case, the ﬁrm’s type is not revealed to domestic consumers and hence it
charges the following price in the domestic market (regardless of its type)
(1 + λµ)z + c
2
Thus, by Deﬁnition 1, we have the following results. (i) If the ﬁrm is of Type A, it dumps





















∗ < (1 + λµ)z
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma 1.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y3 .
T h ep r o o f so fP a r t s( 1 )a n d( 2 )o ft h i sc o r o l l a r ya r eo b v i o u s .
As for Part (3), noting that if (5.11) is satisﬁed, the (4.1) will be satisﬁed. The rest of
the proof is trivial.
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Table 1. Percentage of Advertisements That Refer to Exporting to Advanced Countries      
           
   Percent of Advertisements Claiming Exports to Advanced Countries  
  People's Daily  Jin Ji Daily  Wen Hui Morning Post 
Sectors  1991-2000   1991-1996   1991-2000   1991-1996  1991-2000   1991-1996  
Textile Industry                                 14.34 12.27  5.95 7.94  10.91  16.67 
Garments and Other Fiber Products                9.27 6.79  12.83  21.39  5.95  9.92 
Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products         18.89 16.67 14.58  10.00  0.70 1.75 
Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane, Palm Fiber and Straw Products  4.06 2.38 6.25  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Papermaking and Paper Products                   3.57 8.33 3.13  5.00  16.67  16.62 
Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products     7.94 5.54 7.62  9.04  3.18  1.60 
Medical and Pharmaceutical Products              2.39 2.83 2.42  4.03  3.65  6.09 
Rubber Products                                  32.02 45.83 28.52  34.44  44.48  44.44 
Plastic Products                                 4.76 0.00 8.33  0.00  50.00  0.00 
Nonmetal Mineral Products                        15.22 11.85  0.00 0.00 0.50 0.83 
Metal Products                                   13.37 6.60  0.96 1.60 0.00  0.00 
Ordinary Machinery                               5.74 4.20 6.80  9.45  2.59  3.89 
Special Purpose Equipment                        13.34 16.95  4.47 5.60 2.35 2.74 
Transport Equipment                              2.41 1.73 1.02  0.77  1.67  0.79 
Electric Equipment and Machinery, except Household Electronic Apparatus    1.80  0.86  19.37  20.78  7.69  12.82 
Household Electronic Apparatus     11.07  2.97  6.47  4.08  10.98  6.43 
Electronic and Telecommunications Equipment      4.81 1.82 0.41  0.68  3.25  5.31 
Instruments, Meters, Cultural and Office Machinery  1.15 0.21 4.45  6.06  2.90  2.25 
 